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Abstract
The consensus operator provides a method for combining possibly conflicting beliefs within the
Dempster–Shafer belief theory, and represents an alternative to the traditional Dempster’s rule. This
paper describes how the consensus operator can be applied to dogmatic conflicting opinions, i.e.,
when the degree of conflict is very high. It overcomes shortcomings of Dempster’s rule and other
operators that have been proposed for combining possibly conflicting beliefs.
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1. Introduction
Ever since the publication of Shafer’s book A Mathematical Theory of Evidence [13]
there has been continuous controversy around the so-called Dempster’s rule. The purpose
of Dempster’s rule is to combine two conflicting beliefs into a single belief that reflects the
two conflicting beliefs in a fair and equal way.
Dempster’s rule has been criticised mainly because highly conflicting beliefs tend to
produce counterintuitive results. This has been formulated in the form of examples by
Zadeh [18] and Cohen [3] among others. The problem with Dempster’s rule is due to
its normalisation which redistributes conflicting belief masses to non-conflicting beliefs,
and thereby tends to eliminate any conflicting characteristics in the resulting belief mass
distribution. An alternative called the non-normalised Dempster’s rule proposed by Smets
[14] avoids this particular problem by allocating all conflicting belief masses to the empty
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set. Smets explains this by arguing that the presence of highly conflicting beliefs indicates
that some possible event must have been overlooked (the open world assumption) and
therefore is missing in the frame of discernment. The idea is that conflicting belief masses
should be allocated to this missing (empty) event. Smets has also proposed to interpret the
amount of belief mass allocated to the empty set as a measure of conflict between separate
beliefs [15].
In this paper we describe an alternative rule for combining conflicting belief functions
called the consensus operator. The consensus operator forms part of subjective logic
which is described in [9]. Our consensus operator is different from Dempster’s rule but
has the same purpose; namely of combining possibly conflicting beliefs. The definition
of the consensus operator in [9] and earlier publications does not cover combination
of conflicting dogmatic beliefs, i.e., highly conflicting beliefs. This paper extends the
definition of the consensus operator to also cover such cases. A comparison between the
consensus operator and the two variants of Dempster’s rule is provided in the form of
examples.
Subjective logic is a framework for artificial reasoning with uncertain beliefs which for
example can be applied to legal reasoning [10] and authentication in computer networks
[8]. In subjective logic, beliefs must be expressed on binary frames of discernment, and
coarsening is necessary if the original frame of discernment is larger than binary. Section 2
describes some basic elements from the Dempster–Shafer theory as well as some new
concepts related to coarsening. Section 3 describes the opinion metric which is the binary
belief representation used in subjective logic. Section 4 describes the consensus operator
which operates on opinions and Section 5 provides a comparison between the consensus
operator and the two variants of Dempster’s rule. A discussion of our results is provided in
Section 6.
2. Representing uncertain beliefs
The first step in applying the Dempster–Shafer belief model [13] is to define a set of
possible states of a given system, called the frame of discernment denoted by Θ .
The powerset of Θ , denoted by 2Θ , contains all possible unions of the sets in Θ
including Θ itself. Elementary sets in a frame of discernment Θ will be called atomic
sets because they do not contain subsets. It is assumed that only one atomic set can be true
at any one time. If a set is assumed to be true, then all supersets are considered true as well.
An observer who believes that one or several sets in the powerset of Θ might be true can
assign belief masses to these sets. Belief mass on an atomic set x ∈ 2Θ is interpreted as the
belief that the set in question is true. Belief mass on a non-atomic set x ∈ 2Θ is interpreted
as the belief that one of the atomic sets it contains is true, but that the observer is uncertain
about which of them is true. The following definition is central in the Dempster–Shafer
theory.
Definition 1 (Belief mass assignment). Let Θ be a frame of discernment. If with each
subset x ∈ 2Θ a number mΘ(x) is associated such that:
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(1) mΘ(x) 0,
(2) mΘ(∅)= 0,
(3) ∑x∈2Θ mΘ(x)= 1,
then mΘ is called a belief mass assignment2 on Θ , or BMA for short. For each subset
x ∈ 2Θ , the number mΘ(x) is called the belief mass3 of x .
A belief mass mΘ(x) expresses the belief assigned to the set x and does not express
any belief in subsets of x in particular. A BMA is called dogmatic if mΘ(Θ)= 0 (see [15,
p. 277]) because the total amount of belief mass has been committed.
In contrast to belief mass, the belief in a set must be interpreted as an observer’s total
belief that a particular set is true. The next definition from the Dempster–Shafer theory
will make it clear that belief in x not only depends on belief mass assigned to x but also
on belief mass assigned to subsets of x .
Definition 2 (Belief function). Let Θ be a frame of discernment, and let mΘ be a BMA
on Θ . Then the belief function corresponding with mΘ is the function b : 2Θ → [0,1]
defined by:
b(x)=
∑
y⊆x
mΘ(y), x, y ∈ 2Θ.
Similarly to belief, an observer’s disbelief must be interpreted as the total belief that a
set is not true. The following definition is ours.
Definition 3 (Disbelief function). Let Θ be a frame of discernment, and let mΘ be a BMA
on Θ . Then the disbelief function corresponding with mΘ is the function d : 2Θ → [0,1]
defined by:
d(x)=
∑
y∩x=∅
mΘ(y), x, y ∈ 2Θ.
The disbelief in x is equal to the belief in x, and corresponds to the doubt of x in Shafer’s
book. However, we choose to use the term ‘disbelief’ because we feel that for example the
case when it is certain that a set is false can better be described by ‘total disbelief’ than by
‘total doubt’. Our next definition expresses uncertainty regarding a given set as the sum of
belief masses on supersets or on partly overlapping sets of x .
Definition 4 (Uncertainty function). Let Θ be a frame of discernment, and let mΘ be
a BMA on Θ . Then the uncertainty function corresponding with mΘ is the function
u : 2Θ →[0,1] defined by:
u(x)=
∑
y∩x 	=∅, y 	⊆x
mΘ(y), x, y ∈ 2Θ.
2 Called basic probability assignment in [13].
3 Called basic probability number in [13].
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The sum of the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions is equal to the sum of the belief
masses in a BMA which according to Definition 1 is equal to 1. The following equality is
therefore trivial to prove:
b(x)+ d(x)+ u(x)= 1, x ∈ 2Θ, x 	= ∅. (1)
For the purpose of deriving probability expectation values of sets in 2Θ , we will show
that knowing the relative number of atomic sets is also needed in addition to belief masses.
For any particular set x the atomicity of x is the number of atomic sets it contains, denoted
by |x|. If Θ is a frame of discernment, the atomicity of Θ is equal to the total number
of atomic sets. Similarly, if x, y ∈ 2Θ then the overlap between x and y relative to y can
be expressed in terms of atomic sets. Our next definition captures this idea of relative
atomicity:
Definition 5 (Relative atomicity). Let Θ be a frame of discernment and let x, y ∈ 2Θ . Then
the relative atomicity of x to y is the function a : 2Θ →[0,1] defined by:
a(x/y)= |x ∩ y||y| , x, y ∈ 2
Θ.
It can be observed that (x ∩ y = ∅)⇒ (a(x/y)= 0), and that (y ⊆ x)⇒ (a(x/y)= 1).
In all other cases the relative atomicity will be a value between 0 and 1. The relative
atomicity of an atomic set to its frame of discernment, denoted by a(x/Θ), can simply
be written as a(x). If nothing else is specified, the relative atomicity of a set then refers to
the frame of discernment.
A frame of discernment with a corresponding BMA can be used to determine a
probability expectation value for any given set. The greater the relative atomicity of
a particular set the more the uncertainty function will contribute to the probability
expectation value of that set.
Definition 6 (Probability expectation). Let Θ be a frame of discernment with BMA
mΘ , then the probability expectation function corresponding with mΘ is the function
E : 2Θ →[0,1] defined by:
E(x)=
∑
y
mΘ(y)a(x/y), x, y ∈ 2Θ.
Definition 6 is equivalent to the pignistic probability justified by, e.g., Smets and Kennes
in [16], and corresponds to the principle of insufficient reason: a belief mass assigned to
the union of n atomic sets is split equally among these n sets.
In order to simplify the representation of uncertain beliefs for particular sets we will
define a focused frame of discernment which will always be binary, i.e., it will only contain
(focus on) one particular set and its complement. The focused frame of discernment and
the corresponding BMA will for the set in focus produce the same belief, disbelief and
uncertainty functions as the original frame of discernment and BMA. The definitions of
the focused frame of discernment and the focused BMA are given below.
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Definition 7 (Focused frame of discernment). Let Θ be a frame of discernment and let
x ∈ 2Θ . The frame of discernment denoted by Θ˜x containing only x and x, where x is the
complement of x in Θ is then called a focused frame of discernment with focus on x .
Definition 8 (Focused belief mass assignment). Let Θ be a frame of discernment with
BMA mΘ where b(x), d(x) and u(x) are the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions
of x in 2Θ , and let a(x) be the real relative atomicity of x in Θ . Let Θ˜x be the focused
frame of discernment with focus on x . The corresponding focused BMA mΘ˜x and relative
atomicity aΘ˜x (x) on Θ˜x is defined according to:

mΘ˜x (x)= b(x),
mΘ˜x (x)= d(x),
mΘ˜x (Θ˜
x)= u(x),


aΘ˜x (x)=
E(x)− b(x)
u(x)
for u(x) 	= 0,
aΘ˜x (x)= a(x) for u(x)= 0.
(2)
When the original frame of discernmentΘ contains more than 2 atomic sets, the relative
atomicity of x in the focused frame of discernment Θ˜x is in general different from 12
although Θ˜x per definition contains exactly two sets. The focused relative atomicity of x
in Θ˜x is defined so that the probability expectation value of x is equal in Θ and Θ˜x , and
the expression for aΘ˜x (x) can be determined by using Definition 6. A focused relative
atomicity represents the weighted average of relative atomicities of x to all other sets in
function of their uncertainty belief mass. Working with focused BMAs makes it possible to
represent the belief function of any set in 2Θ using a binary frame of discernment, making
the notation very compact.
3. The opinion space
For purpose of having a simple and intuitive representation of uncertain beliefs we
will define a 3-dimensional metric called opinion but which will contain a 4th redundant
parameter in order to allow a simple and compact definition of the consensus operator. It is
assumed that all beliefs are held by individuals and the notation will therefore include belief
ownership. Let for example agent A express his or her beliefs about the truth of set x in
some frame of discernment. We will denote A’s belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative
atomicity functions as bAx , dAx , uAx and aAx respectively, where the superscript indicates
belief ownership and the subscript indicates the belief target.
Definition 9 (Opinion metric). Let Θ be a binary frame of discernment containing sets
x and x , and let mΘ be the BMA on Θ held by A where bAx , dAx and uAx represent A’s
belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions on x in 2Θ respectively, and let aAx represent the
relative atomicity of x in Θ . Then A’s opinion about x , denoted by ωAx , is the tuple:
ωAx =
(
bAx , d
A
x ,u
A
x , a
A
x
)
.
The three coordinates (b, d,u) are dependent through Eq. (1) so that one is redundant.
As such they represent nothing more than the traditional Bel (Belief) and Pl (Plausibility)
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Fig. 1. Opinion triangle with ωx as example.
pair of Shaferian belief theory, where Bel = b and Pl = b + u. However, using (Bel, Pl)
instead of (b, d,u) would have produced unnecessary complexity in the definition of the
consensus operator below. Eq. (1) defines a triangle that can be used to graphically illustrate
opinions as shown in Fig. 1.
As an example the position of the opinion ωx = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50, 0.60) is indicated
as a point in the triangle. The horizontal base line between the belief and disbelief corners
is called the probability axis. As shown in the figure, the probability expectation value
E(x) = 0.7 and the relative atomicity a(x) = 0.60 can be graphically represented as
points on the probability axis. The line joining the top corner of the triangle and the
relative atomicity point is called the director. The projector is parallel to the director
and passes through the opinion point ωx . Its intersection with the probability axis defines
the probability expectation value which otherwise can be computed by the formula of
Definition 6. Opinions situated on the probability axis are called dogmatic opinions,
representing traditional probabilities without uncertainty. The distance between an opinion
point and the probability axis can be interpreted as the degree of uncertainty. Opinions
situated in the left or right corner, i.e., with either b = 1 or d = 1 are called absolute
opinions, corresponding to TRUE or FALSE states in binary logic.
4. The consensus operator
The consensus opinion of two possibly conflicting argument opinions is an opinion
that reflects both argument opinions in a fair and equal way, i.e., when two observers have
beliefs about the truth of x resulting from distinct pieces of evidence about x , the consensus
operator produces a consensus belief that combines the two separate beliefs into one. If for
example a process can produce two outcomes x and x, and A and B have observed the
process over two different time intervals so that they have formed two independent opinions
about the likelihood of x to occur, then the consensus opinion is the belief about x to occur
which a single agent would have had after having observed the process during both periods.
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Definition 10 (Consensus operator). Let ωAx = (bAx , dAx ,uAx , aAx ) and ωBx = (bBx , dBx ,uBx ,
aBx ) be opinions respectively held by agents A and B about the same state x , and let
κ = uAx + uBx − uAx uBx . When uAx ,uBx → 0, the relative dogmatism between ωAx and ωBx
is defined by γ so that γ = uBx /uAx . Let ωA,Bx = (bA,Bx , dA,Bx , uA,Bx , aA,Bx ) be the opinion
such that:
For κ 	= 0 For κ = 0
1. bA,Bx = (bAx uBx + bBx uAx )/κ 1. bA,Bx = γ b
A
x +bBx
γ+1
2. dA,Bx = (dAx uBx + dBx uAx )/κ 2. dA,Bx = γ d
A
x +dBx
γ+1
3. uA,Bx = (uAx uBx )/κ 3. uA,Bx = 0
4. aA,Bx = a
A
x u
B
x +aBx uAx −(aAx +aBx )uAx uBx
uAx +uBx −2uAx uBx
, 4. aA,Bx = γ a
A
x +aBx
γ+1 .
Then ωA,Bx is called the consensus opinion between ωAx and ωBx , representing an imaginary
agent [A,B]’s opinion about x , as if that agent represented both A and B . By using the
symbol ‘⊕’ to designate this operator, we define ωA,Bx ≡ ωAx ⊕ ωBx .
It is easy to prove that the consensus operator is both commutative and associative
which means that the order in which opinions are combined has no importance. It can also
be shown that the consensus opinion satisfies Eq. (1), i.e., that bA,Bx + dA,Bx + uA,Bx = 1.
Opinion independence must be assumed, which for example translates into not allowing
an agent’s opinion to be counted more than once, and also that that the argument opinions
must be based on distinct pieces of evidence.
Briefly said, the consensus operator is obtained by mapping beta-probability density
functions to the opinion space. It can be shown that posteriori probabilities of binary
events can be represented by the beta-pdf (see, e.g., [2, p. 298]). The beta-family of
density functions is a continuous family of functions indexed by the two parameters α
and β . The parameters of beta-distributions, which for example can represent the number of
observations of events, can be combined by simple addition, and thus a way of combining
evidence emerges. We refer the reader to [9] for a detailed description of how the consensus
operator can be derived from the combination of beta-distributions.
The consensus of two totally uncertain opinions results in a new totally uncertain
opinion, although the relative atomicity is not well defined in that case. Two observers
would normally agree on the relative atomicity, and in case of two totally uncertain
opinions we require that they do so, so that the consensus relative atomicity for example
can be defined as aA,Bx = aAx .
In [9] it is incorrectly stated that the consensus operator can not be applied to
two dogmatic opinions, i.e., when κ = 0. The definition above rectifies this so that
dogmatic opinions can be combined. This result is obtained by computing the limits of
(b
A,B
x , d
A,B
x , u
A,B
x , a
A,B
x ) as u
A
x ,u
B
x → 0 using the relative dogmatism between A and B
defined by γ = uBx /uAx . This result makes the consensus operator more general than
Dempster’s rule because the latter excludes the combination of totally conflicting beliefs.
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In order to understand the meaning of the relative dogmatism γ , it is useful to consider
a process with possible outcomes {x,x} that produces γ times as many x as x. For
example when throwing a fair dice and some mechanism makes sure that A only observes
the outcome of ‘six’ and B only observes the outcome of ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, ‘four’
and ‘five’, then A will think the dice only produces ‘six’ and B will think that the dice
never produces ‘six’. After infinitely many observations A and B will have the conflicting
dogmatic opinions ωA
‘six’ = (1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 16 ) and ωB‘six’ = (0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 16 ) respectively.
On the average B observes 5 times more events than A so that B remains 5 times more
dogmatic than A as uA
‘six’, u
B
‘six’ → 0, meaning that the relative dogmatism between A
and B is γ = 1/5. By combining their opinions according to the case where κ = 0 in
Definition 10 and inserting the value of γ , the combined opinion about obtaining a ‘six’
with the dice can be computed as ωA,B
‘six’ = ( 16 , 56 , 0, 16 ), which is exactly what one would
expect.
In the last example, the relative dogmatism was finite and non-zero, but it is also
possible to imagine extreme relative dogmatisms, e.g., γ = ∞ or γ = ε where ε is
an infinitesimal (i.e., close to zero). This is related to the concept of epsilon belief
functions which has been applied to default reasoning by Benferhat et al. in [1]. Epsilon
belief functions are opinions with b, d,u ∈ {0, ε,1 − ε}, i.e., opinions situated close
to a corner of the triangle in Fig. 1. Without going into details it can be shown that
some properties of extreme relative dogmatisms seem suitable for default reasoning. For
example, when the relative dogmatism between A and B is infinite (γ A/B = ∞) the
consensus opinion is equal to A’s argument opinion (ωA,Bx = ωAx ), and when the relative
dogmatism is infinitesimal (γ A/B = ε) the consensus opinion is equal to B’s argument
opinion (ωA,Bx = ωBx ). However, with three agents A, B , and C where γ A/B = ε1 and
γ A/C = ε2 the consensus opinion ωA,B,Cx is non-conclusive as long as the relationship
between ε1 and ε2 is unknown.
5. Comparing the consensus operator with Dempster’s rule
This section describes three examples that compare Dempster’s rule, the non-normalised
Dempster’s rule and the consensus operator. The definition of Dempster’s rule and the non-
normalised rule is given below. In order to distinguish between the consensus operator and
Dempster’s rule, the latter will be denoted by ⊕′.
Definition 11. Let Θ be a frame of discernment, and let mAΘ and mBΘ be BMAs on Θ . Then
mAΘ ⊕′ mBΘ is a function mAΘ ⊕′ mBΘ : 2Θ →[0,1] such that:
1. mAΘ ⊕′ mBΘ(∅)=
∑
y∩z=∅mAΘ(y) ·mBΘ(z)−K , and
2. mAΘ ⊕′ mBΘ(x)= (
∑
y∩z=x mAΘ(y) ·mBΘ(z))/(1−K), for all x 	= ∅,
where K =∑y∩z=∅mAΘ(y) ·mBΘ(z) and K 	= 1 in Dempster’s rule, and where K = 0 in
the non-normalised version.
A. Jøsang / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 157–170 165
5.1. Example 1: dogmatic conflicting beliefs
We will start with the well known example that Zadeh [18] used for the purpose of
criticising Dempster’s rule. Smets [14] used the same example in defence of the non-
normalised version of Dempster’s rule.
Suppose that we have a murder case with three suspects; Peter, Paul and Mary and two
witnesses W1 and W2 who give highly conflicting testimonies. Table 1 gives the witnesses’
belief masses in Zadeh’s example and the resulting belief masses after applying Dempster’s
rule, the non-normalised rule and the consensus operator.
Because the frame of discernment in Zadeh’s example is ternary, a focused binary frame
of discernment must be derived in order to apply the consensus operator. The focused
opinions are:
ω
W1
Peter =
(
0.99, 0.01, 0.00, 13
)
, ω
W2
Peter =
(
0.00, 1.00, 0.00, 13
)
,
ω
W1
Paul =
(
0.01, 0.99, 0.00, 13
)
, ω
W2
Paul =
(
0.01, 0.99, 0.00, 13
)
,
ω
W1
Mary=
(
0.00, 1.00, 0.00, 13
)
, ω
W2
Mary=
(
0.99, 0.01, 0.00, 13
)
.
The above opinions are all dogmatic, and the case where κ = 0 in Definition 10 must
be invoked. Because of the symmetry between W1 and W2 we determine the relative
dogmatism between W1 and W2 to be γ = 1. The consensus opinion values and their
corresponding probability expectation values can then be computed as:
ω
W1,W2
Peter =
(
0.495, 0.505, 0.000, 13
)
, E
(
ω
W1,W2
Peter
)= 0.495,
ω
W1,W2
Paul =
(
0.010, 0.990, 0.000, 13
)
, E
(
ω
W1,W2
Paul
)= 0.010,
ω
W1,W2
Mary =
(
0.495, 0.505, 0.000, 13
)
, E
(
ω
W1,W2
Mary
)= 0.495.
The column for the consensus operator in Table 1 is obtained by taking the ‘belief’
coordinate from the consensus opinions above. Dempster’s rule selects the least suspected
by both witnesses as the guilty. The non-normalised version acquits all the suspects and
indicates that the guilty has to be someone else. This is explained by Smets [14] with
the so-called open world interpretation of the frame of discernment. In [15] Smets also
proposed to interpret m(∅) (= 0.9999 in this case) as a measure of the degree of conflict
between the argument beliefs.
The consensus operator respects conflicting beliefs by giving the average of beliefs to
Peter and Mary, whereas the non-conflicting beliefs on Paul is kept unaltered. This result
Table 1
Comparison of operators in Zadeh’s example
W1 W2 Dempster’s rule Non-normalised Consensus
Dempster’s rule operator
Peter 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.495
Paul 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.0001 0.010
Mary 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.0000 0.495
Θ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.000
∅ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9999 0.000
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is consistent with classical estimation theory (see, e.g., comments to Smets [14, p. 278]
by M.R.B. Clarke) which is based on taking the average of probability estimates when all
estimates have equal weight.
5.2. Example 2: conflicting beliefs with uncertainty
In the following example uncertainty is introduced by allocating some belief to the set
Θ = {Peter,Paul,Mary}. Table 2 gives the modified BMAs and the results of applying the
rules.
The frame of discernment in this modified example is again a ternary, and a focused
binary frame of discernment must be derived in order to apply the consensus operator. The
focused opinions are given below:
ω
W1
Peter =
(
0.98, 0.01, 0.01, 13
)
, ω
W2
Peter =
(
0.00, 0.99, 0.01, 13
)
,
ω
W1
Paul =
(
0.01, 0.98, 0.01, 13
)
, ω
W2
Paul =
(
0.01, 0.98, 0.01, 13
)
,
ω
W1
Mary=
(
0.00, 0.99, 0.01, 13
)
, ω
W2
Mary=
(
0.98, 0.01, 0.01, 13
)
.
The consensus opinion values and their corresponding probability expectation values
are:
ω
W1,W2
Peter =
(
0.492, 0.503, 0.005, 13
)
, E
(
ω
W1,W2
Peter
)= 0.494,
ω
W1,W2
Paul =
(
0.010, 0.985, 0.005, 13
)
, E
(
ω
W1,W2
Paul
)= 0.012,
ω
W1,W2
Mary =
(
0.492, 0.503, 0.005, 13
)
, E
(
ω
W1,W2
Mary
)= 0.494.
The column for the consensus operator in Table 2 is obtained by taking the
‘belief’ coordinate from the consensus opinions above. When uncertainty is introduced,
Dempster’s rule corresponds well with intuitive human judgement. The non-normalised
Dempster’s rule however still indicates that none of the suspects are guilty and that new
suspects must be found, or alternatively that the degree of conflict is still high, despite
introducing uncertainty.
The consensus operator corresponds well with human judgement and gives almost the
same result as Dempster’s rule, but not exactly. Note that the values resulting from the
consensus operator have been rounded off after the third decimal.
The belief masses resulting from Dempster’s rule in Table 2 add up to 1. The ‘belief’
parameters of the consensus opinions resulting from the consensus operator do not add up
Table 2
Comparison of operators after introducing uncertainty in Zadeh’s example
W1 W2 Dempster’s rule Non-normalised Consensus
Dempster’s rule operator
Peter 0.98 0.00 0.490 0.0098 0.492
Paul 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.0003 0.010
Mary 0.00 0.98 0.490 0.0098 0.492
Θ 0.01 0.01 0.005 0.0001 0.005
∅ 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.9800 0.000
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Table 3
Comparison of operators i.c.o. equal beliefs
W1 W2 Dempster’s rule Non-normalised Consensus
Dempster’s rule operator
x 0.90 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.947
x 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000
Θ 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.053
∅ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000
to 1 because they are actually taken from 3 different focused frames of discernment, but
the following holds:
E
(
ω
W1,W2
Peter
)+ E(ωW1,W2Paul )+ E(ωW1,W2Mary )= 1.
5.3. Example 3: harmonious beliefs
The previous example seemed to indicate that Dempster’s rule and the consensus
operator give very similar results in the presence of uncertainty. However, this is not always
the case as illustrated by the following example. Let two witnesses W1 and W2 have equal
beliefs about the truth of x . The agents’ BMAs and the results of applying the rules are
give in Table 3.
The consensus opinion about x and the corresponding probability expectation value are:
ωW1,W2x = (0.947, 0.000, 0.053, 0.500), E
(
ωW1,W2x
)= 0.974.
It is difficult to give an intuitive judgement of these results. It can be observed
that Dempster’s rule and the non-normalised version produce equal results because the
witnesses’ BMAs are non-conflicting. The two variants of Dempster’s rule amplify the
combined belief twice as much as the consensus operator and this difference needs an
explanation. The consensus operator produces results that are consistent with statistical
analysis (see [9]) and in the absence of other criteria for intuitive or formal judgement, this
constitutes a strong argument in favour of the consensus operator.
6. Discussion and conclusion
In addition to the three belief combination rules analysed here, numerous others have
been presented in the literature, e.g., the rule proposed by Yager [17] that transfers
conflicting belief mass mAΘ(x)⊕mBΘ(y) to Θ whenever x ∩ y = ∅, and the rule proposed
by Dubois and Prade [5] that transfers conflicting belief mass mAΘ(x) ⊕ mBΘ(y) to
x ∪ y whenever x ∩ y = ∅. These rules are commutative, but unfortunately they are not
associative, which seems counterintuitive. Assuming that beliefs from different sources
should be treated in the same way, why should the result depend on the order in which they
are combined? After analysing the rules of Dempster, Smets, Yager, Dubois and Prade as
well as simple statistical average, Murphy [12] rejects the rules of Yager and Dubois and
Prade for their lack of associativity, and concludes that Dempster’s rule performs best for
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its convergence properties, accompanied by statistical average to warn of possible errors
when the degree of conflict is high. Our consensus operator seems to combine both the
desirable convergence properties of Dempster’s rule when the degree of conflict is low,
and the natural average of beliefs when the degree of conflict is high. As mentioned in
Lefévre et al. [11], Dempster’s rule and it’s non-normalised version require that all belief
sources are reliable, whereas Yager’s and Dubois and Prade’s rules require that at least one
of the belief sources is reliable for the result to be meaningful. The consensus operator
does not make any assumption about reliability of the belief sources, but does of course
not escape the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ principle.
An argument that could be used against our consensus operator, is that it does not
give any indication of possible belief conflict. Indeed, by looking at the result only, it
does not tell whether the original beliefs were in harmony or in conflict, and it would
have been nice if it did. A possible way to incorporate the degree of conflict is to add
an extra ‘conflict’ parameter. This could for example be the belief mass assigned to ∅ in
Smets’ rule, which in the opinion notation can be defined as cA,Bx = bAx dBx + bBx dAx where
c
A,B
x ∈ [0,1]. The consensus opinion with conflict parameter would then be expressed as
ω
A,B
x = (bA,Bx , dA,Bx , uA,Bx , aA,Bx , cA,Bx ). The conflict parameter would only be relevant for
combined belief, and not for original beliefs. A default value c = −1 could for example
indicate original belief, because a default value c= 0 could be misunderstood as indicating
that a belief comes from combined harmonious beliefs, even though it is an original belief.
Opinions can be derived by coarsening any frame of discernment and BMA through the
focusing process, where focusing on different states produces different opinions. In this
context it is in general not meaningful to relate belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions
from opinions that focus on different states even though the opinions are derived from
the same frame of discernment and belief mass assignment. The only way to relate such
opinions is through the probability expectation value E(ωx) (which can also be written as
E(x)), and this leads to interesting results. The proof of the following theorem can be found
in [9].
Theorem 1 (Kolmogorov axioms). Given a frame of discernment Θ with a BMA mΘ , the
probability expectation function E with domain 2Θ satisfies:
(1) E(x) 0 for all x ∈ 2Θ .
(2) E(Θ)= 1.
(3) If x1, x2 . . . ∈ 2Θ are pairwise disjoint, then E(⋃|2Θ |i=1 xi)=∑|2Θ |i=1 E(xi).
This shows that probability theory can be built on top of belief theory through the
probability expectation value. As such belief functions should not be interpreted as
probabilities, instead there is a surjective (onto) mapping from the belief space to the
probability space. Belief and possibility functions have been interpreted as upper and lower
probability bounds respectively (see, e.g., Halpern and Fagin [7], and de Cooman and Ayles
[4]). Belief functions can be useful for estimating probability values but not to set bounds,
because the probability of a real event can never be determined with absolute certainty,
and neither can upper and lower bounds to it. Our view is that probability always is a
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subjective notion, inasmuch as it is a 1-dimensional belief measure felt by a given person
facing a given event. Objective, physical or real probability is a meaningless notion. This
view is shared by, e.g., de Finetti [6]. In the same way, an opinion as defined here, is a
3-dimensional belief measure felt by a given person facing a given event.
It has also been suggested to interpret belief functions as evidence (see, e.g., Fagin
and Halpern [7]). Belief can result from evidence in the form of observing an event or
knowing internal properties of a system, or from more subjective and intangible experience.
Statistical evidence can for example be translated into belief functions, as described in [9],
and other types of evidence can be intuitively translated into belief functions, but belief
and evidence are not the same. We prefer to leave belief functions as a distinct concept in
its own right, and in general not try to interpret them as anything else.
The opinion metric described here provides a simple and compact notation for beliefs
in the Shaferian belief model. We have presented an alternative to Dempster’s rule which
is consistent with probabilistic and statistical analysis, and which seems more suitable for
combining highly conflicting beliefs as well as for combining harmonious beliefs, than
Dempster’s rule and its non-normalised version. The fact that a binary focused frame of
discernment must be derived in order to apply the consensus operator puts no restriction
on its applicability. The resulting beliefs for each event can still be compared and can form
the basis for decision making.
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